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Taxonomy of delays in the implementation
of hospital computerized physician order
entry and clinical decision support systems
for prescribing: a longitudinal qualitative
study
Hajar Mozaffar1*, Kathrin M. Cresswell1, Lisa Lee1, Robin Williams2, Aziz Sheikh1 and On behalf of the NIHR
ePrescribing Programme Team
Abstract
Background: Implementation delays are common in health information technology (HIT) projects. In this paper,
we sought to explore the reasons for delays in implementing major hospital-based HIT, through studying
computerized physician order entry (CPOE) and clinical decision support (CDS) systems for prescribing and to
develop a provisional taxonomy of causes of implementation delays.
Methods: We undertook a series of longitudinal, qualitative case studies to investigate the implementation and
adoption of CPOE and CDS systems for prescribing in hospitals in the U.K. We used a combination of semi-
structured interviews from six case study sites and two whole day expert roundtable discussions to collect data.
Interviews were carried out with users, implementers and suppliers of CPOE/CDS systems. We used thematic
analysis to examine the results, drawing on perspectives surrounding the biography of artefacts.
Results: We identified 15 major factors contributing to delays in implementation of CPOE and CDS systems. These
were then categorized in a two-by-two delay classification matrix: one axis distinguishing tactical versus unintended
causes of delay, and the second axis illustrating internal i.e., (the adopting hospital) versus external (i.e., suppliers,
other hospitals, policymakers) related causes.
Conclusions: Our taxonomy of delays in HIT implementation should enable system developers, implementers and
policymakers to better plan and manage future implementations. More detailed planning at the outset, considering
long-term strategies, sustained user engagement, and phased implementation approaches appeared to reduce the
risks of delays. It should however be noted that whilst some delays are likely to be preventable, other delays cannot
be easily avoided and taking steps to minimize these may negatively affect the longer-term use of the system.
Keywords: Adoption, Delays, Health Information Technology, Implementation
* Correspondence: h.mozaffar@ed.ac.uk
1Centre for Medical Informatics, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences
and Informatics, The University of Edinburgh, Doorway number 3, Teviot
Place, Edinburgh EH8 9AG, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 Mozaffar et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Mozaffar et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2016) 16:25 
DOI 10.1186/s12911-016-0263-x
Background
Policymakers in many countries consider health informa-
tion technologies (HITs), such as computerized physician
order entry (CPOE) and computer decision support
(CDS) systems, to be critical attempts to achieve safer,
higher quality, and more efficient health care [1–6]. With
growing appreciation of the potential benefits of such sys-
tems, substantial investments are being made into HIT
and this is translating into widespread adoption of these
systems by hospitals [7]. However, as in other industries,
implementations of IT are often delayed beyond their ini-
tially estimated delivery times [8–11]. In fact, evidence
from a large number of studies suggests that more than
half of IT projects fail to meet their initially estimated
budget and/or timelines [12]. Delays in information sys-
tem projects may increase the risk of not achieving
organizational goals [13–15]. Ross and Vitale [16] describe
an extreme case, in which an implementation overran
timelines so much that no one wanted the system by the
time it went live. In this case, interfacing a large number
of disparate systems in the course of implementing an en-
terprise system led to unexpected integration testing
times, which in turn contributed to the eventual non-
acceptance of the system [16].
Delays are particularly pervasive in HIT implementa-
tions [17]. Projects overrun their timelines as implemen-
tations are often planned by people who are detached
from the reality of delivering care [18]. Implementation
delays not only cause extra financial burdens, but they
also can lead to low morale among NHS staff [19] and
impair end-user acceptance and effective use of systems,
which could eventually lead to ‘failure’ or removal of the
system [20]. Also delays can cause frustration to all par-
ticipating organizations, ranging from users to govern-
ments and funding bodies [21]. This will also call for
extensive review of the programs and widespread public
criticisms of the process [22]. However despite the
prevalence of delays and their potential consequences,
there are very few studies that explicitly examine the
causes of these delays. Failure to understand these rea-
sons results in the same issues and problems being re-
peated over and over again [20]. The few available
studies, which are around wider enterprise information
systems, report on the implementation success factors,
in which meeting project timelines is seen as one of the
indicators of success. Such studies mention appropriate
planning, minimum changes to the system, adequate
mix of developers (IT implementation team members)
and non-IT staff (e.g., decision makers and end users),
and appropriate training to play a role in completion of
the projects on-time and on-budget [23–30]. While use-
ful, these studies have three main shortcomings which
will be addressed in the current paper. First, they tend
to report the local and immediate issues that arise
during a project implementation time and ignore the sup-
ply side [31]. Second, as the focus of these studies is not
on the timeliness of the implementations, they fail to offer
a comprehensive list of causes. Third, they have a wider
enterprise system focus, which falls short of explaining the
particularities of hospital-based HIT implementations.
With the increasing scale and complexity of IT invest-
ments in health care in many developed countries, it has
become clear that delays are the norm. Understanding the
types and causes of delays and their clinical, financial, and
organizational implications is therefore crucial – and can
help to ameliorate potential adverse consequences. Hence,
the purpose of this paper is to explore the causes of
hospital-based IT implementation delays and develop a
taxonomy of delays. This needs a more nuanced view
which examines the complex socio-technical aspects and
relationships involved in the process [20]. In order to
achieve this and to address the above mentioned issues,
we report on our study of the implementation of CPOE
and CDS prescribing systems in hospitals. This work is a
part of a national evaluation of CPOE and CDS systems in
the UK hospitals, commissioned by England’s National
Institute for Health Research (NIHR). CPOE and CDS are
amongst the systems which have attracted the most atten-
tion from scholars in the field of HIT [32, 33] as they are
potentially very transformative and have complex
sociotechnical consequences [34]. They, together with
Electronic Health Records (EHRs), are known to be
amongst the most complex HITs which are commonly ex-
pected to bring the biggest benefits to patients and health-
care providers [35, 36]. As a result, despite the increasing
interest in their implementation in hospitals, they are fa-
cing a wide range of challenges to be implemented in
timely manner [37]. They are therefore likely to offer some
important potentially transferable lessons in relation to
other complex potentially transformative commercial HIT
interventions.
Methods
We conducted a longitudinal, qualitative multi-site case
study investigating the sociotechnical challenges leading to
delays in CPOE and CDS system implementation [38, 39].
We considered any type of implementation time overruns
(actual time taken to implement compared to planned pro-
ject time) as a delay.
Institutional review board approval and ethical
considerations
We received guidance from the National Health Service
(NHS) Health Research Authority National Research
Ethics Service (NRES) Committee London on 6 August
2012 that the study did not require NHS Research Ethics
Committee approval as the work was classified as a ser-
vice evaluation. As per our standard practice for studies
Mozaffar et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2016) 16:25 Page 2 of 14
that fall outside of the remit of NHS NRES, we there-
fore obtained ethical approval from The University of
Edinburgh’s Research Ethics Committee dated 18 February
2013. Participants gave their written informed consent to
participate. Data were anonymized for analysis.
Sampling and recruitment
We used purposeful sampling to select six study sites that
were planning to implement or had recently implemented
three different types of CPOE/CDS systems [40, 41]. Our
focus was on packaged applications, rather than bespoke
systems, due to their rapid current and expected future
growth in the UK and international markets [22, 42–44].
The case studies were chosen with a criterion sampling
strategy [45] based on two parameters. The first criterion
was our ‘typology of systems’ such that we selected at least
one system from each of the following categories: standa-
lone system (also known as interoperable systems),
module within an integrated system, and distributed func-
tionality amongst several modules [42]. The second criter-
ion was the maturity of system in the U.K. market – i.e.,
we chose systems which were new on the market as well
as systems which had several implementations in progress
or were already used in several hospitals. Table 1 shows a
description of each case.
These different parameters helped us to investigate dif-
ferent dimensions causing delays for systems with differ-
ing architectures. We then contacted the Director of
Pharmacy or Lead Pharmacist for HIT and used purposive
and snowball sampling to recruit a diverse range of stake-
holders to be interviewed [41]. To address the potential
risks of bias caused by snowballing, after our first contact
with Director of Pharmacy or Lead Pharmacist for HIT,
we used respondent-driven sampling to maximize the
chances of recruiting a maximum variation sample [46] to
include a range of different respondents (e.g., varying
levels of seniority, different professions, and different
viewpoints). Our sample consisted of implementation
team members and users of the system – in particular,
those users who were involved in implementation.
Data collection
We used semi-structured interviews as the main method
of data collection. We supplemented these data with
data collected from expert roundtable discussions. This
was done to take into account as many reasons for the
delays as possible from the perspective of both adopters
and suppliers of technology [47, 48]. We also collected
relevant project documents, these include implementa-
tion risk logs, roll-out plans, and business cases. Com-
bining different methods enabled us to triangulate the
data sources to validate emerging findings [49].
We conducted 214 interviews to obtain data about im-
plementation and adoption of CPOE and CDS systems
with a total of 163 interviewees. Some interviews were
conducted with two or three participants simultaneously.
Interviews were conducted at up to three time points in
each organization. In the three hospitals that imple-
mented the system during our study (Sites B, C, and F)
we conducted: one set of interviews prior to implemen-
tation, one set just after the roll-out, and one set ap-
proximately one year post-implementation. In the
hospital with the very long delay (Site E), we conducted
three rounds of data collection at approximately one year
intervals. However, as the system did not go live in the
duration of our study (due to the delays), all three rounds
of data collection were in fact pre-implementation. In the
two hospitals that already had embedded systems (Sites A
and D), we conducted two sets of interviews with an
Table 1 Summary of the case study sites
Site Site characteristics System description Delay
A Urban, acute care, university hospital
330,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS is a standalone application
- System is widely used by several English hospitals,
further implementations in progress
Project delayed less
than 6 month
B Urban, acute care
3,000,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS as part of an integrated hospital information system
- System has several implementations in progress and is live in
several English hospitals
Project delayed less
than 6 month
C Urban, acute care, university hospital
750,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS as a standalone application, interfaces built to enable
decision support and interoperability with the wider hospital
information systems
- System is widely used by several English hospitals
Project delayed less
than 6 month
D Urban, acute care, university hospital
3,500,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS as part of an integrated hospital information system
- Part of a joint procurement program- System has several
implementations in progress and is live in several English hospitals
Project delayed less
than 6 month
E Urban, acute care
550,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS as a standalone application
- System is new to UK market (no prior implementations)
Rollout delayed almost
three years
F Urban, acute care, university hospital
540,000 patients per year
- CPOE/CDS as part of an integrated hospital information system
- Part of a joint procurement program- System has several
implementations in progress and is live in several English hospitals
Project delayed less
than 6 month
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approximate 18 months gap between the two rounds.
Table 2 provides a summary of data collection from
each site.
The interviews consisted of open-ended questions
about the procurement, implementation process and chal-
lenges, and use of the system. The topic of project timing
and delays emerged spontaneously during the discussions
and was followed up as a theme. The interview guides
were therefore tailored to the roles/organizations of indi-
viduals to explore the reasons and implications of time
overruns. Each interview took between 15 min to two
hours (the mean time was 29 min). Data were collected
between December 2011 and August 2015.
We also conducted two full day expert round-table
discussions. Both meetings were held in Birmingham,
U.K., and they were moderated by members of our re-
search team. The first meeting (known as the business
case workshop), held in October 2012, involved 17 par-
ticipants including policymakers, clinicians from differ-
ent hospitals, representatives of suppliers, academics,
and patients. In this meeting, participants discussed
topics around conceptualization and planning of imple-
mentations, specification of system functionality and
drafting a business cases. The second meeting (known as
the supplier workshop) had nine participants, representing
six key vendors operating in England. In this meeting, the
supplier representatives discussed issues, challenges and
opportunities arising from the early stages of planning and
procurement of CPOE/CDS systems to their implementa-
tion, use and long-term optimizations.
Interview and roundtable meeting data were digitally
audio-recorded with written consent from participants
and transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriber.
The researchers, also recorded field notes for each meet-
ing and interview.
Data analysis
We drew on the biography of artefact (BoA) perspective
to capture views of both adopters and suppliers of
CPOE/CDS products and to develop longitudinal in-
sights into how outcomes were shaped by prior sets of
decisions [31, 47, 48].
We used NVivo 10 to analyze the data. A combination
of thematic inductive and deductive analysis was used to
examine the collected data and identify the main themes.
We drew on a coding framework, based on the BoA, sur-
rounding the technology lifecycle to build our themes.
BoA informed our work in several ways [31, 47]: 1) to
move beyond a single timeframe and evaluate the situation
from initiation to use (by conducting a longitudinal study
that examined the immediate as well as long-term conse-
quences); 2) to move beyond a ‘localist’ perspective (by in-
cluding the perspectives of adopters, suppliers, and
policymakers and forming both the external and internal
factors as explained in the results section); and 3) to exam-
ine both technical and non-technical aspects of the system.
The BoA perspective allowed us to better understand and
classify the causes and drivers of project overrun.
Considering the above mentioned aspects, initially the
trained qualitative lead researcher for each case study
(HM, KC, LL) analyzed each case separately to form the
themes. We then conducted cross-case comparisons dur-
ing analysis meetings held amongst all authors. In order to
do this, we initially read each transcript and then exam-
ined it in relation to other transcripts. This allowed us to
search across data sets and identify patterns [50].
Results
The length of delays varied substantially in our cases ran-
ging from one month to several years (more than three
years). However, in all cases we found a combination of
Table 2 Summary of the interviews
Site Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
A 23 interviews with 24 interviewees
(19 clinical staff and 5 implementation team)
9 interviews with 10 interviewees
(5 clinical staff and 5 implementation team)
5 interviewed before
B 24 interviews with 24 interviewees
(17 clinical staff and 7 implementation team)
17 interviews with 17 interviewees
(12 clinical staff and 5 implementation team)
8 interviewed before
C 13 Interviews with 13 interviewees
(7 clinical staff and 6 implementation team)
18 interviews with 18 interviewees
(15 clinical staff and 3 implementation team)
8 interviewed before
20 interviews with 20 interviewees
(17 clinical staff and 3 implementation team)
10 interviewed before
D 15 interviews with 15 interviewees
(8 clinical staff and 7 implementation team)
11 interviews with 11 interviewees
(7 clinical staff and 4 implementation team)
10 interviewed before
E 19 interviews with 19 interviewees
(19 clinical staff and 9 implementation teams)
7 interviews with 6 interviewees
(3 clinical staff and 3 implementation team)
1 interviewed before
3 interviews with 3 interviewees
(3 implementation team) 1 interviewed before
F 15 interviews with 18 interviewees
(14 clinical staff and 4 implementation team)
12 interviews with 12 interviewees
(9 clinical staff and 3 implementation teams)
10 interviewed before
8 interviews with 8 interviewees
(6 clinical staff and 2 implementation team)
6 interviewed before
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causes leading to time overruns. We identified 15 main in-
terrelated reasons (shown in Table 3) leading to imple-
mentation delays.
Drawing on our analytical framework, closer examin-
ation of this long list of delays revealed two main categor-
ies: delays caused by issues arising within the adopting
hospital and delays originating from outside the adopting
hospital (including other adopters and technology sup-
pliers). As we analyzed the results further, another cross-
cutting distinction emerged: unintended delays versus tac-
tical delays. Unintended delays refer to unplanned and un-
expected issues arising during the implementation which
prevented the system progressing towards ‘go-live’,
whereas tactical delays appeared to result from strategic
longer-term planning decisions, often geared to achieving
smoother or more dependable implementation and use.
Hence, whilst unintended delays caused hindrance to go-
ing live, tactical delays were more deliberate strategies
which addressed the long-term use of the system. Al-
though we have categorized the delays into this taxonomy,
we acknowledge that some types of delays which are at-
tributed to one source may need to be resolved by another
– for example, the adopting hospital may have had con-
cerns about safety, which needed new developments by
supplier to overcome the safety issue. In such cases, we
classified the cause in the category of factors that adopter
perceived to have originally caused the delay.
Table 3 presents a two dimensional model of the tax-
onomy of delays showing the classification of causes in
relation to internal versus external factors and unin-
tended versus tactical delays.
Unintended internal delays
The first set of delays were caused by matters arising
within the adopting organization.
Unrealistic or unclear business cases
First of all, unrealistic or unclear business cases were said
to be the primary cause of slipping on the originally
planned implementation timeline. Due to the complexity of
the CPOE and CDS implementation, it was critical for the
project team to initially develop a precise business case
which incorporated visions of goals and organizational
improvements, and justification for the system. Such a busi-
ness case enabled both suppliers and adopters to gain an
overall understanding of their own as well as each other’s
needs and offerings. However, due to shortage of capacity
and resources in hospitals, business cases were often devel-
oped too quickly and procurements were made without ad-
equate understanding of the problems needing to be
addressed, which in turn led to unrealistic timeframes being
specified.
…your outline business case should [be] clear… [you
need to have] put your business case together, justified
the finances, justified the patient safety quality and
other issues, got an outline of what you plan to do,
issues around the pre-implementation work you don’t
need it all process mapped but you need a clear
understanding of what’s required, resources, skill mix
on their side, not so much on the supplier side but on
their side in order to go ahead, and so that sort of
readiness-check type approach and an outline business
case that should be clear that it should go to market,
it shouldn’t go to market until they’ve done all that.
(Supplier Workshop, Participant 7)
This forced suppliers to enter into contracts without
sufficient prior planning, understanding and agreement
from both sides.
…there’s a klaxon going off in my mind because if
they’re (hospitals) not prepared to share the outline
business case with you… There’s a problem with the
contracting process again here, going back to
contracting because I think we’re, to ask the question
from a supplier point of view you’re boxed into a
corner to sign up to an unrealistic project plan…
(Supplier Workshop, Participant 8)
The lack of clarity in developing business cases further
led to diverse translations of the visions by different stake-
holders, ranging from better management of data and pro-
cesses to achieving a patient-centric health service. Such
views resulted in lack of ability to align system configur-
ation with long-term goals.
Table 3 Taxonomy of Implementation Delays
Unintended Tactical
Internal - Unrealistic or unclear business cases
- Lack of detailed planning
- Limited knowledge of CPOE/CDS
- Human resource capacity
- Poor user training
-Weakness of broader information infrastructure
- Development of other applications
- Customization and modification of applications
- Interfacing with other applications
External - Implementation in other adopting organizations
- Limited supplier capacity
- Safety issues
- Change of supplier organizational structure
- Supplier strategies in responding to user needs
- External contractual obligations
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… so the question is not so much what’s there now…
but it’s also about what’s there now and how it’s going
to align over a longer period of time with a whole load
of other changes coming through, so does the
procurement process take that into account, the health
service procurement process or is it just a single one off
purchase that they do with it? (Business Case
Workshop, Participant 10)
Lack of detailed planning
A high level business case on its own was seen as not
allowing detailed execution of steps on the ground. In
several cases, we found that neither vendors nor adopt-
ing hospitals drew up detailed project plans. This led to
inaccurate implementation time calculations and im-
practical implementation plans. Despite the necessity to
have clear and reasonable milestones, some adopting
hospitals were not rigorous in defining or enforcing
manageable timelines at the early stages of the project.
…the high level planning that went on to support the
business case […] was at a very high level, it was
blocks of time and it was an estimate based on
relatively little information… So the first job I had to
do when I got here was to take the high level plan
which was effectively dots on an Excel worksheet that
were months and break that down to a 500 line
Microsoft Project plan with individual tasks and
individual responsibilities and durations, start and
finish dates and everything else… So once you start to
look at the detail for the individual tasks you get a
project plan that extends quite a bit further than you
first anticipated… (Site E, Senior Project Manager)
Also, in some cases, plans were highly aspirational and
did not present the reality of everyday care provision.
This lack of alignment between “must-haves” and per-
ipheral functions (or “want-haves”) led to higher costs of
implementations and possibly contributed to suppliers
failing to meet the original requirements.
It’s that incremental process isn’t it? There are certain
[features] which are very much aspirational, there are
certain ones which are must haves and there are
certain ones that are a bridge between those two ends
of the spectrum and you need to be able to migrate
from the must haves into the aspirational wants if
they’re still relevant… So if you allow people to specify
all of their aspirational wants, their wish list then any
supplier will eventually turn round and say yeah we
can do all of that, this is how much it will cost you, at
which point most NHS organizations will turn round
and go we can’t have that one… (Business Case
Workshop, Participant 2)
Some suppliers had begun to address these issues by
suggesting stepwise implementations: i.e., implementing
and going-live with the basic functionalities first and then
implementing more complex functionalities (e.g., decision
support). They suggested that this would enable hospitals
to gain an understanding of what was to be developed,
allow them to better plan for their needs and as a result
have better project time and resource management.
I think it’s much better from my experience to go live with
something which is relatively simple, potentially
replicates paper so you roll out this advance functionality
be it drug checking, adverse drug reaction forms that kind
of stuff after the initial adoption stage has pitted out I
guess. (Supplier Workshop, Participant 5)
Further to the above, the lack of detailed planning
added to the delays already being experienced. This
meant that delays became longer as a result of the yearly
patterns of change/patient fluctuation that occurred in
the case sites. Winter pressures meant that when a pro-
ject was delayed by a few months from summer it was
unlikely that the site would be able to start its roll-out
until around February (hospitals chose to delay roll-out
until after the winter busy times as the pressures could
lead to complications at go-live), so a delay of two to
three months turned into one closer to six months.
Limited knowledge of CPOE/CDS
A lack of understanding and experience around the sys-
tem being acquired and its implementation challenges,
coupled with reliance upon high level business cases
without detailed implementation plans also led to under-
estimation of resources in hospitals.
I think the staffing needs that we started with are very
different […] I think we underestimated how much
support we’d need in terms of data analysis and
informatics, that’s probably something we didn’t think
about very much at the beginning. (Business Case
Workshop, Participant 7)
As a result, as implementations proceeded, there was
often a need to increase staffing to deliver the project.
So it’s just learning for us as well of how to roll out
and what support [is needed]… Because sometimes
you plan for things, and then you just suddenly realize
actually we need to do this a bit more. (Site D,
Pharmacist)
Hospitals relative unfamiliarity with many of the CPOE
and CDS systems in the UK market added to the issues
caused by complexity, leading to limited understanding by
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adopting organization about the nature of the COPE and
CDS products. This lack of awareness about project scale,
complexity of implementation process, and systems was
identified as another major reason for lack of detailed
planning.
…until you know what the product looks like and how
it works and how it functions and how long it takes to
deploy it you can’t do detailed planning and obviously,
and this is not a criticism but the people that procured
the product very few of them knew anything about how
to deploy an electronic prescribing product… (Site E,
Senior Project Manager)
Shortage of required human resources
Implementations also overran due to issues with human
resources, which were particularly intractable as projects
spanned many departments and professional groups
across the organization. These complex projects thus re-
quired an implementation team that spanned the
organization and continued to support the implementa-
tion over an extended period. However, some hospitals
lacked the local expertise needed in the implementation
team. They failed to recruit people on time or lost pro-
ject employees during the course of the implementation.
… the reason we slipped from our February go live
initially, we wouldn’t have done it then anyway, to
April and then May is we didn’t have our full team in
place, we couldn’t recruit them. (Site C, Project
Manager)
These teams sometimes had difficulty in engaging the
necessary stakeholder to execute their plans. On the one
hand, certain professional groups were not involved/in-
vited to become part of the implementation team or
when they did, their input was seemingly ignored; on the
other hand, there was a feeling among the implementa-
tion teams that there were many individuals who chose
not to get involved (i.e., they deprioritized the CPOE/
CDS implementation).
Nursing as a whole has had a very small voice and
one of the main reasons behind that and one of the
significant issues that [Site F] has as an organization
is that there’s a 50 % vacancy rate, so ultimately it’s
very difficult to try and engage a workforce that’s very
transient in its population and within its workforce…
(Site F, Lead Nurse for HIT)
The shortage of human resources seemed to arise be-
cause of two related underpinning factors. First of all,
the particular employment practices in the health sector
acted as a disincentive, discouraging individuals from
taking up short-term contracts. It also dissuaded health
professionals to use their newly gained expertise to change
professional rout and become HIT consultants. This
meant their expertise was barely transferred for imple-
mentation of HIT project in other health organizations.
It would be quite common [in other sectors] to have
independent consultants to advise a procurement in
the private sector… We did have two people […] who’d
gone from being implementation experts to being
supply side players but is there a class of people
who’ve implemented [CPOE/CDS] systems who then
serve as [CPOE/CDS] consultants? If not why not, is it
because you can’t pay for them? (Business Case
Workshop, Participant 10)
Secondly, funding issues made it difficult for hospitals
to recruit the required staff for long-term.
… NHS England is giving money over for a finite
amount of time, there’s no money in there for roll out
and the [hospitals] have got to think about this going
forward because that project team that’s there for that
implementation is going to go and unless you get to
that point where the organization is mature enough to
take that on board and move that forward and has
the money to release those people, and we were talking
conservatively at what £300,000 for staff going
forward. So it’s not just about the IT structure and it’s
not just about the project phase… it’s a long road.
(Supplier Workshop, Participant 1)
Poor user training
We also found that in many sites, delays were caused by
a lack of appropriate user training.
But we know we have to do that quite carefully and
with the appropriate training and support and systems
in place otherwise we could be introducing significant
risk to the patients. (Site C, Clinical Effectiveness and
Medicines Manager)
Simplistic assumptions of the extent and the type of
training required for each profession and the time required
by each individual to be released from daily activities led to
new challenges and extended timelines. As a result, further
staffing was required to deal with temporary absence of
staff from their daily duties to attend training classes.
I mean we’ve had some sort of difficulties with training
only in as much as people being released to attend
classroom training because for nurses it’s a whole day
and for doctors it’s half a day. (Site D, Clinical Change
Lead)
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We also observed problems with user engagement
when trainers were not familiar with healthcare practices
and settings.
You do classroom based training and people don’t turn
up that’s the problem. I have anecdotes here and tales
that when you’ve got some senior clinicians being trained
by somebody who’s not from a clinical background they’re
switching off… (Site D, HIT Manager)
Weaknesses of the broader information infrastructure
Implementations were also delayed due to lack of appro-
priate infrastructures in hospitals.
… Clearly you can’t go live with such a thing without
having the appropriate infrastructure in place which
was a major reason for the delays at the beginning.
(Site D, Consultant)
In many cases, the CPOE/CDS system relied upon the
same HIT infrastructure that was used for other applica-
tions, and installed through organization-wide planning
processes. As a result, planning of HIT capacity (hardware
and networks) for CPOE/CDS became dependent on
other HIT projects, which led to timelines being extended.
… probably took three months for us to do our work
and then maybe another month, month and a half to
get machines ready because we identified that if we
were going to go down this whole Terminal Server
2008 route machines had to be upgraded to the latest
service pack and there was a few other little fixes that
had to be done. Like if you’ve got Word open but you
haven’t got it in full screen mode you can click it and
drag it round your screen and what we found was if
the machine weren’t service pack if they had
something else if you dragged it would make like a
drag mark on the screen and it would leave trace
marks everywhere so we had to do like this prep work,
again it was to make the end user experience better.
(Site A, Implementation Team)
Tactical internal delays
We found that the second type of delays was due to
tactical decisions taken by the adopting organization
during the implementation period. We refer to these
as tactical delays because they arose as a result of
strategies adopted to enhance longer-term adoption
and optimized use of the system. So whilst there was
the choice of preventing delays caused by these rea-
sons, organizations decided to take the risk and opt
for a longer-term benefit.
Development of other applications
Our findings show that implementations could be de-
layed as CPOE/CDS became dependent on the imple-
mentation of other applications. Such decisions were
taken particularly with non-integrated systems. Here, de-
cisions to delay the go-live were made by the adopter
organization to achieve a broader goal (e.g., smoother
flow of information between different systems).
The biggest delay and the most significant one was
obviously […] dependency on the delivery of the EDS
[electronic discharge summary] software […]. If you
look at this, just to illustrate this was an updated
version of the plan but the software is going to be
delivered here and we’ve got future stake workshops
scheduled at the time the software is delivered. That
can’t happen, we have to get the software, create the
future stake process maps and then hold the
workshops so this date is likely to go back and this
date is therefore likely to move as well. (Site E, Senior
Project Manager)
In this case, usually third-party “bolt-on” software was
required to extend the use of CPOE/CDS system.
Customization and modification of applications
Customization was also responsible for delays. This type
of delay was usually a result of: a) the CPOE/CDS sys-
tem needing an element to run or Anglicization was
needed to fit UK specific needs (e.g., the need for a par-
ticular UK specific requirements on ‘To Take-home Or-
ders); or b) opportunities were identified to enhance the
use of CPOE/CDS systems by modifying the built-in
functionalities. In the first case, dependency on a par-
ticular element could be a necessity for the organization
to perform (so less of a tactical choice but more of an
imperative), whereas in the second case customization
was a choice rather than a necessity (thus more of a tac-
tical decision).
I think there are probably quite a lot of problems with
[system name]. In the first place, it came as quite an
American product and it’s taken quite a long time to
Anglicize it and make it more suitable for the UK
market … there are quite a lot of NHS specific things
which are not built. (Site D, Information and
Communication Technology Manager)
While this was classified as an internal issue (particu-
larly when customizations were due to system enhance-
ment), actions from suppliers were required to respond to
such needs. Hence delays could occur due to limited sup-
plier capacity or due to suppliers’ strategies in responding
to user needs (discussed below).
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Interfacing with other applications
The need to develop interfaces between various applica-
tions was also an important cause of delays. We ob-
served that, although the systems could go-live, their
implementations were delayed to achieve the longer-
term advantages of transferring data from CPOE/CDS to
other existing systems.
In theory, and I gather from [name of project team
member] certainly last week it still wasn’t fully in
place within the [system name – standalone] system
but in theory they’ll be able to just pull it out from the
[system name] system onto the discharge summary but
she was saying two weeks ago that it wasn’t, that
particular bit wasn’t in place yet but they were working
on it. We’ve got a meeting with them tomorrow so I
might find out more then, but in theory it should make
[hospital medical records] writing easier because they
can just pull it straight off the [CPOE/CDS] system but
that’s not ready to roll yet, she’s concerned that could be
one of the delays that would stop us from starting next
week. (Site C, Senior Sister)
Such interfaces, if designed well, could also be benefi-
cial for the users of the system. However, there was also
the possibility of several designs being tested to achieve
the best result, which in turn could delay the implemen-
tation even further.
That install was different in a number of different
ways. We originally negotiated the contract so that
[system 1 name] would be accessed using [system 2
name]… but it was the wrong decision to make, one,
PAS [patient administration system] are not something
that doctors use very much, doctors tend not to use
PAS systems, two, is any changes to the user interface
would require us to negotiate with [supplier of system
2] to get changes. We wanted to have a single point of
access to all our clinical systems, clinical portal so we
changed it so that we wish to invoke [system 1 name]
which is the [supplier of system 1] product from within
our clinical portal rather than from within {system
1]… But it does change what was deployed because
they had to install additional software. We have
changed where we wish to capture things like allergies,
and height and weight and all of these were changes to
the scope. So basically we’ve restarted the project as I
mentioned with effect from last week… (Site E, Senior
Project Manager)
Although such challenges were mainly observed in stan-
dalone systems, integrated systems presented similar is-
sues, particularly when two-way interfacing between
hospitals and other health and care organizations was
required. Furthermore, the challenges became even more
when customization of integrated systems was needed.
This was because of the higher complexity of integrated
systems resulting from tightly coupled dependencies that
existed between different modules and their underlying
databases.
In general all types of application adaptations –
extension, customization, or interfacing – caused
long delays if they were not planned for in the early stages.
While extensions and interfacing were more evident in
the case of standalone applications, customizations caused
longer delays in integrated applications due to their higher
complexity.
Unintended external delays
While the above mentioned delays resulted mainly from
internal issues or in-house strategies, we found that
there were also unanticipated delays caused by the exter-
nal environment.
Implementation in other adopting organizations
Procurement of solutions by other hospitals created a new
source of delay, as implementations were paused awaiting
resolution of implementation problems in other adopting
organizations. Due to parallel implementations of one
product in several hospitals, implementation in one (or a
few) hospital(s) were delayed/paused as the supplier was
implementing its product in other hospitals, creating a de-
pendency between different organizations.
One of the biggest dependencies for us is the readiness
of the software and that is being driven by [another
hospital name]… there is the critical dependency on
delivery to [other hospital name] but leads to our
project very directly so clearly where [other hospital
name] was delayed that potentially causes delay to
our work … They delayed their go live… we have a
dependency on the same release of software. (Site E,
Senior Project Manager)
This was a major issue especially in CPOE/CDS prod-
ucts, which were new on the UK market due to differ-
ences between the systems functionalities and the needs
of UK hospitals. As a result, suppliers had to go through
complex cycles of market analysis, development and im-
plementation at once. Also, joint procurements [51] led
to further delays as a large number of adaptations in ini-
tial implementations were taking place all at the same
time and suppliers had to deal with various requirements
at once.
Limited supplier capacity
As mentioned earlier (under the customization and
modification of applications section), CPOE/CDS is still
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in its infancy in the UK, and systems are in the process
of being anglicized [37]. However, we observed that lim-
ited supplier capacity resulted in delays of system imple-
mentation. This was a particularly important issue for
overseas suppliers as they had a limited number of em-
ployees present in the UK. Thus, most of the develop-
ment work had to be sent back to the countries of
origin. This in turn, caused complications in capturing
the needs of U.K. settings.
[We were] the first to go live with meds management
in [system name] in the UK fully. Therefore there was
no front runner that you could say well yeah you’ve
already built this for this [hospital…] so there was a
limited resource in the [supplier name] world to assist
the [hospital] in developing and deploying that
product and that does cause delay definitely.
(Site F, Interim director for HIT)
Suppliers’ limited capacity led to lengthy responses to
users’ requests. In some cases, adopting hospitals had to
wait for months for a new release of the product to be
ready before going-live. In other cases, hospitals went
live with an older version in the hope that they would
eventually upgrade to a release in which their requests
were incorporated.
So we have postponed by three months the going live
on the first two wards in essence because the supplier
hasn’t been able to have the product ready for use so
you could say we’re a bit frustrated by that… And
there are things like […] you can get log outs, so you
could get access to certain patients blocked if certain
events happen and that’s quite tricky and is taking
time to get resolved. Their new version of software that
is going to come will make that a much smoother
process but that isn’t yet available, it should be
available before we rollout further. (Site C, Clinical
Effectiveness and Medicines Manager)
Safety issues
Lack of availability of system functionalities sometimes
led to concerns about potential safety risks. In such
cases, the adopting hospital made several efforts to delay
the go-live date until a solution was achieved.
There’s only one thing […] is that there is a facility to
do a free format prescription. Say for example
Parkinson’s medication and you need to give it at
different times of the day, specific times of the day that
don’t fit in with the drug rounds, or sort of a
Methotrexate dose that is given weekly, you can
actually select it weekly but say if the doctor did it in
this free format and said Methotrexate 10 mg weekly
and the system doesn’t understand that that’s weekly,
it doesn’t attach it to a frequency so it then comes up
every single day for admin but they’ve raised that with
[supplier name] as a risk but without looking,
obviously now we know that we would need to look out
for it, we’ve got sort of an alert for any drugs that are
prescribed free format but if you didn’t sort of look on
that thing then you wouldn’t know and obviously the
staff would change every day and they wouldn’t think
oh this patient on Methotrexate yesterday because it
would just come up what needed charting for that day,
so there’s a real risk there… that’s not good enough
particularly when a large number of issues that have
been raised are around absolute patient safety.
(Site A, Pharmacist)
Tactical external delays
The final type of delay was caused by changes of strat-
egies and long-term plans by external entities (i.e., sup-
pliers, third party organizations, and policymakers).
Change of supplier organizational structure
Mergers and acquisitions often have a knock-on impact
on companies external relationships to its customers
[52]. Change of suppliers’ organizational structures
which was a direct result of acquisitions, was another
cause for delays in the implementation process.
Unfortunately for us when I raised the RFC [request
for change] a company called [company name] came
in and took over [company name- original supplier] so
there was a corporate takeover and that delayed the
process. They’re an American company and they
needed a PAS system for the UK market so they
purchased [company name- original supplier] but
obviously that resulted in a five to six week delay
whilst we got the request for change result…
(Site E, Senior Project Manager)
Such changes could lead to contractual modifications
or even strategic change of the application which in turn
caused further delays.
Lack of contract signing [by the new supplier] and
unwillingness to continue to work at risk – this will
likely end up in adding 2–3 months to the timeline…
Issue between [supplier 1 name] and [supplier 2 name]
contracts preventing deployment of software on
existing hardware… (Site E, Project Document)
Supplier strategies in responding to user needs
Another type of tactical delay caused by external entities
was caused by suppliers’ strategies in responding to user
needs. In this respect, suppliers had “sorting and sifting”
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strategies in order to prioritize and plan for their future
developments.
…if we need something to happen we have to log it with
a user group who then have to agree it’s something we
want to take forward which then goes to the vendor, they
decide whether they can be bothered to do it, it then gets
on their work plan and maybe three years later we get
our change… (Site A, Pharmacist)
Suppliers prioritized the needs (including functional
needs and resource needs) and even the customers,
based on internal strategies which in turn led to late re-
sponse to some of users’ requests.
Anything which is dependent on [supplier name] takes
months which is not ideal and we’re also limited by
when they can put the changes in so it can be quite
difficult. (Site F, Consultant)
There were also delays caused by contractual issues
enforced by the supplier. Suppliers sometimes introduced
‘freeze’ periods in the contracts which meant that no
change requests could be put in for a certain period of
time.
External contractual obligations
Two case study hospitals were part of the NPfIT geo-
graphical clusters (North West/West Midlands, North
East, East of England/East Midlands, London, Southern)
programme [51]. This meant that a single contract with a
local service provider (LSP) was signed for a joint develop-
ment of information infrastructure, and as a result the
supplier of CPOE/CDS was subcontracted by the LSP. In
these cases, the National Programme created delays be-
cause of the structure of the contracts which meant that
change requests could not go directly to the supplier and
had to instead go first through the LSP. This arrangement
added bureaucratic layers and thus slowed down the pace
of implementation in these two sites. The contract also
defined staffing levels and resource management strat-
egies, which led to further implementation delays.
[The contract] constrains or limits what the companies
can respond to because they’re constrained by a fairly
large contract and constraints around that so it
defines both the staffing, the product and the services
that you can get so you get a standard approach
rather than a customized approach if you went
directly. (Site F, Change Manager)
An overall picture of the taxonomy
The taxonomy of delays highlighted in this paper is de-
veloped based on the most frequent causes observed
across the sites. Overall, we found that all types of unin-
tended internal delays were evident in all six sites. Also,
apart from development of other applications (which
was a delay cause in Sites A, D, and E), all the other
types of tactical internal delays occurred in all the sites.
In contrast to internal delays, the external delays varied
across sites. Implementation in other adopting organiza-
tions, limited supplier capacity, and change of supplier
organizational structure caused delays only in Sites A
and E. Supplier strategies in responding to user needs
led to delays in Sites A, C and E. Finally, external con-
tractual obligations and safety issues were seen as a delay
cause in all the sites.
Discussion
Delays in the implementation of HIT systems are ex-
tremely common, but poorly understood. To understand
and classify these delays, we have sought to develop a
taxonomy of delays in relation to CPOE and CDS sys-
tems that go beyond a single organization and capture
longer-term dynamics between different stakeholders.
Our taxonomy has the potential to help clarify import-
ant aspects of implementation and facilitate ways to pre-
vent or mitigate the risk of such delays in future
implementations. Our analysis revealed that delays may
occur due to internal and external factors surrounding
the adopting hospital. We found that time overruns may
result from planned strategies as well as unplanned
events. This work also shows that implementation delays
are influenced by a number of risk factors including lack
of knowledge and prior experience, poor project plan-
ning, fading user involvement, limitation of resources,
dependencies due to standardization of systems (i.e., one
supplier offering one product to a number of different
users), immaturity of products and market, and changing
structures and requirements.
Strengths and limitations
Drawing on the BoA framework, which suggests study-
ing organization and technology in tandem over several
timeframe and locales, enabled us to reach an under-
standing of the broad range of delay causes gathered
from views of suppliers, implementers, policymakers,
and adopters over an extended timeframe. We collected
data from six case studies with varying implementation
strategies and different delay durations. We also sought
to capture the range of offerings in the UK market
encompassing both UK and non-UK systems and stan-
dalone and integrated solutions to capture the full range
of delay types and causes. This study, which has built on
our earlier findings on successful implementation and
adoption of HIT systems [53], has been the first to re-
port on issues within and beyond hospitals that lead to
an inability to roll-out a complex HIT system in line with
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originally planned timelines. Although our findings are built
around data collected from CPOE/CDS systems, our results
and recommendations are likely to have implications for a
range of other hospital information technologies such as
electronic health records, specialized chemotherapy appli-
cations, and laboratory systems.
An important limitation of this study is that we have
reported on the causes of delays in a yet growing CPOE/
CDS market which means that as the systems become
more mature new impinging factors may unfold. An-
other limitation was that it is difficult to define delays as
they may occur at different points in a projects lifecycle
[54] (e.g., delays in pilot wards versus delays in roll-out
in all other wards). So we used an inclusive approach
and captured any time overrun for the major projects
milestones. Further studies are needed to validate the
generalizability of the taxonomy for other commercial
off-the-shelf HIT systems.
In planned follow-on work, we plan to extend this
work on causes of delays to other HIT systems and also
seek to identify approaches to minimize the risks and/or
mitigate the adverse consequences of HIT implementa-
tion delays.
Interpretation of findings in the context of the wider
literature
In other industries, it has previously been noted that a
lack of understanding of products and the market ad-
versely influences performance [55] and execution [56]
of a project which can contribute to long implementa-
tion delays. Hence knowledge transfer mechanisms must
be established to lessen uncertainties that cause inaccur-
acies in time estimation which is one source of delay
[57]. Moreover, simplistic assumptions in defining busi-
ness cases and glossing over the complexities, without
developing tailor-made objectives and clear require-
ments, results in inaccurate time assessments. So in the
early stages of project procurement and planning hos-
pital characteristics and its long-term strategies must be
clearly defined [58]. In a yet immature and growing
CPOE/CDS market [42] where understanding of the
technology and knowledge about products on the mar-
ket are limited, extreme efforts are required to align hos-
pital processes and those of the vendor offerings.
Mitchell [57] suggests that intra-organizational coordin-
ation is required to achieve alignment through know-
ledge integration and joint planning by involvement of
suppliers and adopters.
The combination of uncertainties about products,
adopters and demands in this immature market has led
to a situation called ‘the waiting game’ [59]. On the one
hand, for business cases and project plans to be more
precise, hospitals need to refer to earlier implementation
experiences and the availability of CPOE/CDS packages.
On the other hand, products are not fully developed in a
yet uncertain market. So there is a dilemma between go-
ing with existing systems and knowledge, and delaying
the decision while the prospects of the innovation be-
come clearer over time. As studies show, the CPOE/
CDS market is still in its infancy [37] and strategies such
as joint procurement of premature products bring asso-
ciated costs [51]. As a result of premature procurements,
further dilemmas occur around customization and inter-
face requests and even around meeting safety risks. So
there is a trade-off between early implementation versus
waiting till requirements are met. Hence an ongoing co-
ordination between emerging technologies and market
are needed in order to overcome the waiting games
which includes phased introduction of a novel technol-
ogy till products stabilize and implementation experi-
ence increases [59].
Our study shows that delays arise in implementing and
adopting both standalone and integrated solutions. Al-
though some delays are apparent in both cases (such as
shortage of human resources and user training issues),
many other delays differ in character and frequency de-
pending on the type of system. For instance interfacing is-
sues generated long delays in implementation of standalone
applications, in particular because interfaces were required
between the CPOE/CDS system and many other existing
applications in the hospital. In integrated applications,
however, delays caused by interfacing were less frequent.
Instead due to their complexity, customization and modifi-
cation of the applications caused longer delays. Also project
planning and staff engagement challenges are likely to be-
come more pronounced in integrated applications, because
more extensive infrastructures are likely to impinge on an
increasingly wide range of functional departments and oc-
cupational groups. This illustrates an important trade-off
between discrete systems and more complex integrated ap-
plications (Cresswell K, Mozaffar H, Lee L, Williams R,
Sheikh A. Integration and interfacing of hospital health in-
formation technologies: a national qualitative study of hos-
pital electronic Prescribing systems Submitted to BMJ
Quality and Safety).
Implications for policy, practice and research
Policymakers and practitioners have focused on procure-
ment and implementation of HIT in hospitals. In the
light of this evolving technology landscape and drawing
on our research and wider international studies, we sug-
gest that simplistic and unrealistic assumptions at the
early stages of project are unhelpful in making decisions
for procurement and planning of HIT projects. Ad-
equate time and effort must be spent at early stages of
project to capture the needs of short- and long-term
users, system benefits and implementation strategies.
We have obtained important insights about the causes
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of delays in CPOE and CDS implementations. As we
have shown the type of system (i.e., integrated or standa-
lone), maturity in the market, procurement strategy (i.e.,
joint versus single procurement), and implementation
strategy lead to different risks (as well as benefits). To
minimize the negative consequences of these risks, long-
term perspectives are needed prior to procurement as
well as in the course of implementation of these systems.
Finally, we suggest that, as in this study we have investi-
gated commercial systems that are now also being de-
ployed in many hospitals throughout the world, the
considerable complexity of these CPOE/CDS systems,
which should therefore offer considerable insights into
comparably complex systems such as EHRs, and the fact
that our work was undertaken over a number of case
study sites which enabled us to understand the reasons
for the delays encountered, the findings of this study
may be applicable to other commercial off-the-shelf HIT
implementations and if so may help to minimize the fre-
quency and consequences of project delays.
Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly
identify and classify the specific causes of delays and in-
terruptions in implementation of CPOE/CDS systems.
Our work also indicates that, whilst there are strategies
to mitigate some project delays (such as detailed plan-
ning, acquiring better knowledge of the market and sys-
tems, and stepwise implementation strategies), many
other delays are unavoidable. In particular, the immaturity
of the CPOE/CDS products in the market adds to the
complexity of estimating the time required to implement
and of sticking to the plans. Finally, we highlight that
some delays are deliberately adopted in the course of ef-
forts to benefit the smooth implementation and longer-
term usability and performance of the system. Long-term
planning, starting prior to the procurement of systems
and continuing as the system is implemented, is the key to
minimize the risk of these delays. Whether to delay the
go-live date and accept the consequences, or to roll-out
the system and disregard the possible longer-term impacts
is a complex decision.
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